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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (Attorney's fees—Reciprocal 
rights to recover attorney's fees.) 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Utah Administrative Code § R162-4.2.7.3 
When it becomes apparent to the principal broker that a 
transaction has failed, or if a party to the failed 
transaction requests disbursement of the earnest money 
or other trust funds, those funds may be disbursed by the 
principal broker only if a written release is obtained 
from the parties not receiving the funds . . . . 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE HAYES ON THE BASIS OF UTAH 
CODE ANN, § 78-27-56.5 IS APPROPRIATE FOR FEES INCURRED ON 
APPEAL EVEN IF THE STATUTE WAS NOT RAISED ON THE TRIAL COURT 
LEVEL. 
Even though the application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 was 
not raised in this case on the trial court level this Court is not 
entirely barred from considering its application to the case as the 
Palmers contend. This Court should still consider the application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 to the attorney's fees incurred by 
the Hayes on the appeal of this matter. The award of attorney's 
fees on an appeal is an original matter for the appellate court to 
decide. 
The purpose of the reciprocal attorney's fees statute is to 
award attorney's fees to either side that prevails in an action 
where it is clear that one side would recover its attorney's fees 
if it were to prevail in the action: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees.1 
If the Palmers prevail in their suit to recover damages from the 
Hayes for an alleged default in the Hayes' performance of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, it is clear that the Palmers will be 
aUtah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (Attorney's fees—Reciprocal 
rights to recover attorney's fees). 
4 
entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in this action. Paragraph "N" of the Agreement states 
that: 
Both parties agree that should either party default in 
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
suit or otherwise.2 
In situations like this one where it is clear that one side would 
be entitled to an award of attorney's fees if successful, the 
legislature wanted to give the courts equitable discretion to award 
attorney's fees to either side. 
The Palmers contend that even if the statute were applicable 
it would not be equitable to award the Hayes their attorney's fees 
incurred on this appeal because the "Hayes' own refusal of the 
deposit from the brokerage where it was held caused or contributed 
to Palmers' constructive retention of the deposit."3 There are 
several problems with this view of the facts. First, the Hayes 
never refused the refund of the Earnest Money Deposit. The refund 
of the Earnest Money was the very thing which the Hayes have 
sought. Sometime in January the Hayes requested orally that the 
2R. at 10. 
3Reply Brief of Appellants a t 16. 
5 
broker, Maple Hills, return the $2,000 Earnest Money Deposit, In 
response Maple Hills sent the Hayes a document which purported to 
release the Broker, Maple Hills, from all liability in connection 
with the failed sale. Mr. Hayes did refuse to sign this 
inappropriate release, but in no way did he indicate that he was 
refusing the refund of the Earnest Money Deposit.4 
Second, The Hayes have made clear demand for the return of the 
Earnest Money Deposit. After receiving the release from Maple 
Hills, Mr. Hayes wrote to Maple Hills and clearly demanded that the 
Earnest Money be refunded: 
After reviewing the document that was brought to our 
office regarding the disposition of our deposit, I regret 
to inform you that I will be unable to sign it. My 
understanding of the law is that the only person who 
could have claim on the money would be the Palmers. If 
they have such a claim, please advise me. You, on the 
other hand, have no legal right to make conditions under 
which the deposit would be returned. I suggest strongly 
that you either forward the money immediately or let me 
know that the Palmers have requested that it not be 
returned for some reason.5 
Maple Hills never refunded the money nor did they give notice of 
the claims of the Palmers against the Earnest Money. 
Third, the retention of the Earnest Money by the Palmers is 
not a "constructive" retention. In the Palmer's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, the Palmers 
4See, Letter of Edward Hayes, dated Feb. 8, 1993. R. at 107. 
5Id. 
6 
explicitly requested that the court "hold the $2,000 to apply it 
to the huge damages likely to be awarded in this lawsuit."6 This 
attempt to bring a suit for damages without refunding the Earnest 
Money Deposit is more than a mere "constructive retention". It is 
only now on appeal that the Palmers are attempting to recast their 
role as one of innocent bystanders who were unable to exercise any 
control over the $2,000 deposit. 
The release of the Hayes was never necessary for Maple Hills 
to refund the Earnest money deposit to the Hayes. The Regulations 
of the Utah Real Estate Commission which the Palmers have quoted 
at length state that the broker may refund an Earnest Money Deposit 
"only if a written release is obtained from the parties not 
receiving the funds."7 All that was required for the Earnest Money 
Deposit to be refunded to the Hayes was for the Palmers to request 
in writing that Maple Hills do so. This authorization was never 
given by the Palmers and as a result the $2,000 was never refunded. 
All of the attorney's fees incurred by the Hayes in defending 
against this action have been necessitated by the actions of the 
Palmers in bringing a suit for damages without refunding the 
Earnest Money in contravention of the Earnest Money Agreement. It 
is equitable for this Court to award the Hayes their attorney's 
6At 4. (find the cite in the record). 
7Utah Admin. Code § R162-4.2.7.3 (emphasis added). 
7 
fees incurred in this appeal, and the Court has been authorized to 
do so under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. 
II. THE ACTIONS OF THE PALMERS DO CONSTITUTE A "DEFAULT" OF THE 
"COVENANTS AND AGREEMENTS" CONTAINED IN THE EARNEST MONEY 
CONTRACT, THUS TRIGGERING THE ATTORNEY'S FEE CLAUSE. 
The Palmers claim that the decision below reflects a breach 
of an implied duty rather than an express duty, and that the 
contract does not allow for the award of attorney's fees except in 
the case of breach of an express duty.8 The retention of the 
Earnest Money Deposit by the Palmers while bringing suit for 
damages was not a breach of a "judicially imposed duty"9 or of an 
implied duty, but a default of the express provisions of paragraph 
"N" of the Earnest Money Agreement. The Earnest Money Agreement 
clearly provides for the award of attorney's fees in the case of 
"default" of the "covenants or agreements" contained in the 
contract.10 
The election of remedies clause in the Agreement states: "In 
the event of default by buyer, seller may elect to either retain 
8See, Reply Brief of the Appellants at 13-14. 
9Reply Brief of the Appellants at 4. 
10Paragraph "N" of the Earnest Money Agreement states that, 
"Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party 
shall pay all the costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this Agreement . . .." R. at 10. 
8 
the earnest money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to 
enforce any rights of seller."11 This is an express agreement or 
covenant that the seller (the Palmers) will either retain the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or institute a suit for 
damages. To both retain the Earnest Money and sue for damages is 
a violation or "default" of this "covenant or agreement", 
triggering the attorneyfs fee clause. 
The Palmers have tried to construe the issue here as one of 
"constructive retention" of the deposit or a breach of an "implied" 
or "judicially imposed" duty, and thus avoid the attorney's fee 
provision. The facts of the case, however, do not match this 
description. The covenant not to both retain the Earnest Money and 
institute a suit for damages is expressly stated in the contract. 
The Palmers have defaulted on this covenant and the Hayes should, 
therefore, be awarded their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
this action as a matter of right and law.12 
CONCLUSION 
The Palmers have defaulted in their obligations with respect 
to the election of remedies clause of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
nParagraph "N" of the Earnest Money Agreement (emphasis 
added). R. at 10. 
12Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985); Hackford 
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Utah 1982); Saunders v. Sharp. 793 
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990), on remand, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah 
App. 1992); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989). 
9 
This default entitles the Hayes to award of their reasonable 
attorneyf s fees incurred both at the trial court level and on 
appeal. The Hayes seek a reversal of the trial court ruling with 
respect to the attorney's fee issue, and an order from this Court 
awarding them their reasonable attorney's fees. In the event that 
the Court finds the Palmers not to have been in default of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, the Hayes seek an order granting them 
their reasonable attorney's fees incurred on this appeal under the 
equitable discretion vested in the Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56.5. 
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